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Abstract
This paper aims to infer the evolving Fed's in°ation target by estimat-
ing a monetary model under the assumptions of RE and learning. The
results emphasize how di®erent assumptions about expectations may have
important e®ects on the inferred target movements.
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1 Introduction
Monetary models traditionally assume that central banks have an in°ation tar-
get that remains constant over time.
The results by Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004), however, who showed that monetary policy failed to respond aggres-
sively enough to the rising in°ation in the 1970s, suggest that the Fed may have
had a higher in°ation target in that decade. Indeed, the papers by Favero and
Rovelli (2003), Surico (2006), and Dennis (2004) identify one-time shifts in the
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1in°ation target after 1979. Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) estimate a backward-
looking model to derive a continuously-changing in°ation target. Leigh (2005)
and Belaygorod and Dueker (2005) similarly estimate a time-varying in°ation
target focusing on post-Volcker samples. The paper by Ireland (2005) concen-
trates both on estimating the changes of the Fed's in°ation target over time and
in analyzing its patterns, causes, and consequences.
The above papers provide evidence that the in°ation target has moved over
time, rising to 6-8% in the 1970s and declining to around 2% in the 1980s-1990s.
The causes of its changes, instead, remain unclear.
Obviously, the simplest scenario may be that the Federal Reserve has inten-
tionally adopted a higher target in the 1970s. But di®erent interpretations are
possible. For example, some studies (e.g., Sargent 1999, Primiceri 2006, Milani
2005) argue that Fed's learning about the economy may have been responsible
for the run-up of in°ation. Primiceri (2006) and Milani (2005) emphasize that
the 1960s may have induced the Fed to perceive a low persistence in in°ation
and a large in°ation/output trade-o®, which led to overly optimistic forecasts
in the 1970s and made the Fed unwilling to increase interest rates by large
amounts.
If this interpretation is correct, then it is possible that the Fed did not have
a higher target in the 1970s. It may have been the slowness in learning that the
economy was changing that contributed to the rising in°ation.
This hypotheses has not been considered in previous research when estimat-
ing the in°ation target. The cited papers, in fact, typically extract the target
from an economy characterized by rational expectations (RE). The target se-
ries, however, may importantly di®er depending on the assumptions one makes
about expectations.
This paper therefore tries to estimate a changing in°ation target under the
assumption that both the Fed and the private sector are learning. The paper
2then compares the estimated targets under RE and under learning.
2 The Model
In this section, I present a New-Keynesian model (e.g., Woodford 2003) in which
I allow the central bank to employ a time-varying in°ation target. The target
is exogenous. The model is described by the following loglinearized equations
¼t = ·xt + ¯ b Et¼t+1 + ut (1)
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where b Et denotes subjective expectations ( b Et = Et, the usual mathematical ex-
pectations operator, under RE). ¼t denotes in°ation, xt the output gap, and it
the nominal interest rate. Equation (1) is the forward-looking New-Keynesian
Phillips curve that can be derived from the optimizing behavior of ¯rms under
Calvo price setting. 0 < ¯ < 1 represents the discount factor, while · de-
notes the slope of the Phillips curve. Equation (2) represents the loglinearized
intertemporal Euler equation that derives from households' optimal choice of
consumption. ¾ > 0 represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution














. The central bank follows a Taylor rule (eq. (3)) by adjusting
the nominal interest rate in response to deviations of forecasts of in°ation and
output gap from their targets. The in°ation target ¼¤
t follows a random walk.
I shall estimate the model assuming either RE or learning. Under learning,
I will assume that economic agents use the following perceived law of motion
3(PLM) to form their expectations
Yt = Á0;t + Á1;tYt¡1 + ²t (7)
where Yt ´ [¼t;xt]0 and where Á0;t and Á1;t denote a vector of constants and a
matrix of coe±cients. As additional data become available, they update their
estimates according to the constant-gain learning formula1
b Át = b Át¡1 + gR
¡1
t¡1Yt¡1(Yt ¡ Y 0
t¡1b Át¡1) (8)
Rt = Rt¡1 + g(Yt¡1Y 0
t¡1 ¡ Rt¡1) (9)
where b Át = vec(Á0;t;Á1;t)0 describes the updating of the learning rule coef-
¯cients, and Rt the updating of the second moments matrix of the stacked
regressors Yt¡1 ´ f1;¼t;xtg
t¡1
0 . g denotes the constant gain coe±cient. Eco-
nomic agents use their PLM and the data up to t ¡ 1 to form expectations of
future output gap and in°ation in t + 1.
3 Estimating the Federal Reserve's Changing In-
°ation Target
I use Bayesian methods in the estimation to ¯t the series for in°ation, output
gap, and the federal funds rate.2 I jointly estimate the structural parameters
of the model and the time-varying in°ation target under di®erent expectations
assumptions: RE and subjective expectations with learning. The target is un-
observed and derived through runs of Kalman ¯lter and Kalman smoother. I
¯x ¯ = 0:99, Â¼ = 1:5, Âx = :5, Ág = 0:9, and Áu = 0:9. I also ¯x the constant
gain g to the value estimated in Milani (2004b), i.e. 0:0183, and use pre-sample
(1951-1959) data to initialize the learning algorithm. Table 1 reports infor-
1Branch and Evans (2006) show that constant-gain learning outperforms several alterna-
tives in forecasting output and in°ation.
2See Milani (2004b, 2005, 2006) for more details on the estimation. I use quarterly U.S.
data for the period 1960:I-2005:II. For output gap I use the log di®erence between GDP and
CBO Potential GDP.
4mation about the priors. Table 2 presents posterior estimates under RE and
learning.
Under RE, I estimate ¾ = :006 and · = :013. Under learning, instead,
the estimates become ¾ = :064 and · = :078. Figure 1 shows the evolution of
agents' beliefs. As in Milani (2004a), the agents perceive a negative intercept
and a low autoregressive term in in°ation until the early 1970s, together with a
large sensitivity to changes in output. These estimates lead economic agents to
underestimate in°ation in the period (Figure 2).
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the Fed's in°ation target. The implied target
under RE starts low in 1960, but it rises to 6% at the beginning of the 1970s.
The target remains high during the 1970s, until Volcker's disin°ation reduces
it from 6% to 2%. The target remains slightly above 2% during most of the
1980s-1990s. This behavior is not far from that found by Ireland (2005).
Under learning, the in°ation target starts from above 5%, but it is estimated
around 4% from the late 1960s to 1975. The target starts to decline already in
1975 to fall below 1% during Volcker's disin°ation. The target equals 2% in the
early 1990s, but it jumps to 5% in the second half of the decade, although with
no e®ects on realized in°ation, before a slight decline after 2003.
4 Discussion
I have estimated a monetary model under the alternative assumptions of RE
and learning to infer the evolution of the Fed's in°ation target from 1960 to
2005. The evidence of time variation in the target is robust to the di®erent
assumptions about expectations. But the implied target series look di®erent in
several sample periods. The target assumes values around 6% in the ¯rst half of
the 1970s under RE, and values around 4% under learning, giving some merit to
the learning interpretation of rising in°ation. Under learning, the target starts
5to fall in 1975, whereas under RE the decline starts only after 1978. Finally,
after 1995, under learning, but not under RE, the Fed seems to behave as if the
target is again higher.
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7Parameters Prior Distr. Prior Mean 95% Prior Prob. Interval
¯ ¡ :99 ¡
· G :25 [:03;:70]
¾ G 1 [:12;2:79]
½ ¡ :9 ¡
Â¼ ¡ 1:5 ¡
Âx ¡ :5 ¡
½r ¡ :9 ¡
½u ¡ :9 ¡
½¼¤ ¡ 1 ¡
¾" IG 1 [:34;2:81]
¾r IG 1 [:34;2:81]
¾u IG 1 [:34;2:81]
¾¼¤ IG 1 [:34;2:81]
g ¡ :0183 ¡
Table 1 - Prior Distributions. Note: G=Gamma, IG=Inverse Gamma.
Rational Expectations Learning
Parameters Post. Mean 95% Post. Prob. Int. Post. Mean 95% Post. Prob. Int.
¯ :99 ¡ :99 ¡
· :006 [:0009;:015] :064 [:01;:15]
¾ :013 [:003;:029] :078 [:01;:22]
½ :9 ¡ :9 ¡
Â¼ 1:5 ¡ 1:5 ¡
Âx :5 ¡ :5 ¡
½r :9 ¡ :9 ¡
½u :9 ¡ :9 ¡
½¼¤ 1 ¡ 1 ¡
¾" :9 [:81;1] :91 [:82;1]
¾r :1 [:08;:11] 1:5 [1:36;1:66]
¾u :15 [:13;:17] :84 [:76;:92]
¾¼¤ :38 [:23;:54] :70 [:32;1:34]
g ¡ ¡ :0183 ¡
































































Figure 1: Evolution of agents' beliefs, 1960:I-2005:II.



















































Figure 2: In°ation and Output Gap Forecasts.











Figure 3: Actual In°ation and Estimated Time-Varying In°ation Targets under
RE and Learning.
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